Bastion Industrial and Infrastructure Portfolio Third Quarter 2025 Letter

Bastion Industrial and Infrastructure Portfolio Third Quarter 2025 Letter

Buy Greatness and Hold

By John Rotonti, Portfolio Manager

The Bastion Industrial and Infrastructure model portfolio launched on January 24, 2025. Since that inception date through the end of Q3:2025 (a period that represents a little over eight months) the portfolio appreciated 16.87% net of a 1% fee, compared to the S&P 500 which returned 10.62% during the same time period. The model portfolio return was generated while holding roughly 20% cash in a money market fund yielding about 4%. I place no importance on short-term results (even results that flatter me), and I encourage you to do the same. 

Importantly, I think that 6.25% of alpha (after fees) is extraordinary, and I do not expect to maintain this level of outperformance over time. I understand that most clients hire me to outperform the market, and I think that’s an important and noble goal when measured over a long-enough period. My hope is that my intense dedication and obsession with trying to master the craft of investing, my time in the market and experience as a business analyst, my quest to ask the right questions, my network, and my refined investing philosophy and process could lead to long-term outperformance over the S&P 500. But beating the market is exceedingly hard (according to S&P Global SPIVA 86% to 88% of domestic fund managers underperformed the S&P 500 over the last five-, ten-, and fifteen-years) and we really won’t know if I’m capable of doing so going forward for the next ten years. 

I measure myself in other ways as well. The minimum hurdle I set for myself is to generate annualized returns equal to inflation plus 5%. Additionally, my goal is to help my clients build towards total financial freedom over the next ten to 30 years. Why 10 to 30 years? Because I’m trying to invest in businesses that spread their growth and value creation out over time so anything less than ten years is too short, and 30 years is long enough for the magic of compounding to take effect. I also hope to be a portfolio manager until I’m at least 75 years old. 

I suppose the next logical place to take this letter is to tell you how I hope to achieve my three goals of (1) long-term outperformance relative to the S&P 500, (2) annualized returns equal to at least inflation plus 5%, and (3) helping my clients achieve financial freedom by retirement. And the answer is simple and won’t be a surprise to anyone that knows me or has followed my writings and messages over the last 10+ years. 

The answer is to own a concentrated portfolio of stocks in what I believe are the highest quality, most resilient, best managed businesses with long-duration runways of per-share value growth at reasonable valuations AND to hold them for as long as I think they remain great and as long as I think the management teams remain great and as long as I think the valuations remains sane. I plan to hold what I view as greatness with an iron fist because the magic of investing is the possibility for asymmetric upside derived from decades of compounded returns! The only way to achieve a ten-bagger, hundred-bagger, or even thousand-bagger is to hold through lots of ups and downs over years (and in most cases decades). I’m not saying (and I emphasize this) that I will invest in multi-baggers on behalf of my clients…only that I know for a certainty that I won’t if I part ways with outliers too soon. To be clear, I hope to own most of our stocks in 10 years and even some when I’m writing investor letters in 30 years. A “day 1” stock is a stock that has been in the portfolio since inception. My hope is that you’ll hear the phrase “day 1 stocks” a lot from me over the years to drill the point that we are long-term business owners with an appreciation for the rarity of outliers and the math of investing, with our focal points firmly set on the horizon a decade or more into the future. 

The most important thing to understand about my investing and portfolio management philosophy and strategy is that it is one of steadfast, unwavering long-term outlook and uncompromising quality (based on my assessment) in terms of what I’m willing to put into the portfolio. I just covered the patient, long-term horizon (and will revisit that more down below), so for now I’d like to focus on what I mean by “quality.” When I say quality, I’m referring to both business quality and managerial/leadership quality, and I measure this quality both quantitatively and qualitatively. I have a slide in a deck that I share with clients and prospects that reach out to me that I think are suitable for my strategy. 

Here is what that slide says…

“The Bastion Industrial and Infrastructure strategy is a domestic, long-term focused, low-turnover, roughly 20 – 30 stock portfolio that aims to invest in the highest-quality industrial, infrastructure, technology, and housing-related businesses at reasonable valuations. 

Importantly, the businesses should be run by leaders that think and act like owners, and that are economically aligned with outside shareholders. The vast majority of holdings will have already achieved scale, have healthy balance sheets (sometimes with net cash), have high and/or rising returns on invested capital (ROIC), stable or growing free cash flows (FCF), and what I think are long runways of per-share earnings growth. The rate of growth is less important than the duration of per-share growth (as long as the valuations are reasonable). I believe these businesses have high barriers to entry, wide and sustainable moats, and several will operate in oligopolies or duopolies with high and stable market share, pricing power, and limited competition. Others will have leading market shares in highly fragmented industries providing opportunities for long runways of profitable growth through both market share gains (organic growth) and consolidation/M&A (inorganic growth). The businesses will offer strong value propositions and solve big, important problems. I’m looking to invest in companies that do hard things and do those hard things well. I’ve got to believe these businesses are resilient and adaptable with survivorship and longevity genes and an almost maniacal focus on maximizing long-term business value per share.”

I think that summary encapsulates my investing philosophy/strategy well. It ought to because I wrote it. You can read more about some quantitative measures of quality here and here. Also, below are some other questions I’ve been asked by clients over the last eight months…

How do you define “domestic”? 

I define domestic as companies that trade on a U.S. exchange and report in U.S. dollars. So, a company could be headquartered in Ireland, but if it meets the two criteria (as well as my quality criteria) then it is eligible for inclusion into the portfolio.

How many domestic companies have you identified that meet your quality criteria for the business and management team?

I’ve identified about 50 of these high-quality businesses that I’ve researched and think I understand well and have a point of view on, and those fifty make up the investing universe that I keep a very close eye on. There are currently 26 stocks in the portfolio so roughly half of the universe (as it stands today) is in the portfolio.

How often do you add new businesses to the universe?

I think about adding businesses (and most importantly the people running those businesses) like I do adding close friends…I don’t do it lightly. The hurdle to become a close friend (close like family) should be very high, as should the hurdle for businesses and management teams worthy of our trust and dollars. I expect to add about one or two new businesses to the universe each year, if that. I think in terms of opportunity cost, and it’s a very high hurdle to get into my quality universe because I believe strongly that keeping the universe as high-quality as possible is the best risk mitigation tool. At this point, I’m not actively looking for new ideas (not already in the universe), but I occasionally unintentionally come across a new business that interests me through my reading and network. But even then, I find that in most cases, I discard new ideas in about the first ten minutes to an hour of initial research. Instead, I spend my time monitoring the portfolio and universe through maintenance coverage and ongoing learning. 

What do you mean by “reasonable” valuation?

For most stocks, at the time of purchase, I have a required rate of return of at least 12%, meaning that I think EPS growth plus dividend yield plus or minus the change in the P/E ratio can yield 12% average annual returns over the next five years. But I invest across a growth and return spectrum so I do have several holdings that I think can deliver annualized total shareholder returns (TSR) of higher than 12%. And in most cases, I will continue to hold stocks as long as I think they can deliver 7% annualized returns over the next five years. Why 7%? Because that’s a ten-year double and my minimum required rate of return to continue to own what I think is an outstanding business. Recall that my minimum required rate of return is inflation plus 5% over time, and the Federal Reserve’s current target rate for inflation is 2%. It’s true that with the current inflation rate at 3%, my minimum required rate of return is pushed up to 8%, but over time I think a minimum hurdle of 7% is a good rough goal. 

You co-authored an article in Value Investor insight that says Warren Buffett has rarely ever paid more than a forward P/E of 15x? Why are you willing to do so?

Let’s just say that I have a deep yearning for the days when I can add to our existing holdings and add a few new stocks from the quality universe at a NTM P/E of 15x or less. Heck, I yearn for just being able to buy far-above average businesses (in the quality tier I’m looking at) at a below average P/E multiple (which is currently 22x on the S&P 500). But higher-quality, long-duration, profitable growth businesses have higher justified (warranted) P/Es and, on average, stocks in high-quality businesses (as measured by high returns on invested capital) have historically outperformed the market, indicating (to me, at least) that the high multiples the market has historically rewarded higher-quality business have not been high enough. If they were fairly and appropriately valued, then those high ROIC stocks with higher-than-average ROICs would have only received a market-rate of return. Of course, the past is not a prelude to the future and this pattern may not hold going forward. Finally, I think it’s also important to point out that I don’t compare myself to Warren Buffett. He’s the GOAT and I’m just me. I do what I’m most comfortable with and what I think is best for my clients over the long-term. 

What valuation methods do you use?

You can read about my valuation methods here and here. I don’t think I have an edge in valuation! If I do have an edge in investing, I think it’s mindset (long-term patient outlook, emotional composure, an inborn aversion to FOMO and dilution, and a willingness to consider an advantaged corporate culture as a source of sustainable moat). Regarding valuation specifically, if I maybe do something differently, it’s that I try to identify companies that I think can maintain per-share growth longer than the average company and longer than the market expects. Recall that duration of profit-cycle growth is far more important to me than rate of growth. A lot of value investors (far more skilled and experienced than me) aren’t willing to assume a company can grow at above market rates beyond their model (projection) period of say three to ten years. Rather, they want to buy current earnings power and get the growth for free. And that’s a fine formula. But, for better or worse, when I think it’s warranted, I’m a value investor that is willing to assume longer-duration growth and, in some cases, willing to give my companies time to grow into their multiples (in other words valuing the companies on out-year numbers). Finally, the shareholder value that superior, owner-operator management teams can add, as well as optionality, are very hard to put a value on. I give some companies credit for those attributes as well. 

Why not sell stocks when the expected return drops below your initial hurdle of 12%?

Because, as stressed above, I believe that the potential for the highest asymmetric upside comes from compounded returns achieved through decades-long holding periods. The first step is to try to identify and purchase stocks in high-quality, profitable growth, highly-resilient, superbly managed businesses at reasonable valuations, and I think the next equally important step is to hold them long enough for compounding to kick into high gear. Additionally, I also believe that good things happen to great companies. I have found that great companies end up surprising to the upside over time because they make their own luck by finding (and sometime even creating) new profitable growth opportunities and building optionality into the business model. Superb management teams create cultures that adapt to the highly unpredictable and rapidly changing world so that their products and services remain relevant, in high demand, and reflective of where the future is likely going. Great companies can get rejuvenated during a crisis because they have the financial resilience and firepower to invest countercyclically during downturns by acquiring assets at distressed prices or repurchasing large amounts of undervalued stock. These actions during a crisis can plant the seeds for higher market share, accelerated growth, higher margins and returns on invested capital, and higher earnings power once the crisis subsides. Surviving and even thriving through the crisis also can make companies stronger, more resilient, even anti-fragile…forged in fire, so to speak. Finally, I strongly believe that everything is cyclical when measured over long-enough time frames, and that the typical corporate life cycle that resembles an S-curve (of startup, growth, maturity, and decline) does not always apply to all businesses. In other words, as mentioned above, some of the best businesses can find new growth opportunities (thereby stacking new S-curves on top of their original curve). In effect, this means that long-duration growth businesses can ride different profit cycles over their lifetimes where sometimes growth is slower and sometimes it’s faster. Importantly, Michael Mauboussin has shown that corporate lifecycles do not have to always be linear. That is, companies in the maturity stage can jump backwards to the growth phase, and because everything is cyclical over time, I think great companies can repeat this process over and over again, essentially reversing the aging cycle and prolonging eventual decline, if they have the right management in place and a deeply embedded corporate DNA of adaptability, survivorship, and longevity. For these reasons, I give our companies a long-enough leash to work through periods of growing pains and fixable issues. 

Why limit yourself to industrial, infrastructure, technology, and housing-related businesses?

When I joined Bastion over one year ago, one of the guardrails I was given regarding portfolio construction was that I had to attach a “theme” to it. I chose industrial, infrastructure, technology, and housing-related businesses for several reasons. First, these are the industries I understand best, and I think they are packed full of sustainable wide-moat, profitable growth businesses that are managed for their shareholders with longer-than-normal runways of EPS growth. Second, industrial, infrastructure, technology, and housing-related can be defined broadly, allowing me to operate as a generalist and to create what I think is an adequately diversified portfolio for many clients. Third, I believe that select businesses in each of these industries are powered by long-duration tailwinds such as AI and the AI factory buildout, the reindustrialization of America (and other parts of the world), a housing shortage and supply/demand imbalance, and the build out of the grid and electrification of everything. Some other qualities I like about industrial companies (broadly defined) include that: 

• (1) many of the executive compensation programs are partly based on return on invested capital (ROIC) or free cash flow (FCF).

• (2) many of them have owner-operator cultures with high-enough insider ownership and a general repulsion for share dilution.

• (3) some have self-help initiatives that include divesting or spinning off lower-margin, slower growing, and more cyclical parts of the business. This can have the effect of increasing the rate of organic growth, raising margins and returns on invested capital, strengthening the balance sheet, increasing the predictability of the business, and possibly even increasing recurring revenue.

• (4) the fragmented nature of some end markets provides almost unbounded growth opportunities for companies that have built a world-class acquisition platform and an owner-operator culture that can be passed from one generation of leadership to the next and that permeates throughout the organization.

• (5) many of these companies have large and growing installed bases with a faster growing, higher margin services business attached, which has the effect of not only improving business economics but also increasing the value proposition and increasing customer captivity/switching costs. 

• (6) and several industrials have counter-cyclical free cash flow generation such that some of these companies generate their highest FCF conversion (FCF to GAAP net income) at the cycle trough, allowing them to, as discussed above, use the downturn as an opportunity to plant the seeds for rejuvenated growth and margins coming out of the cycle. 

Can you talk a bit more about some of these tailwinds you mentioned in the prior answer?

I’m not going to go into each separate tailwind here in too much detail, but let’s quickly examine global infrastructure spend. In 2017 the G20 estimated that the world needs $97 trillion in global infrastructure spend by 2040. More recently, Larry Fink (the CEO of BlackRock, which is the world’s largest asset manager) wrote that the world needs $68 trillion in global infrastructure spend by 2040. These are almost mind-bogglingly gargantuan numbers, but critical to the way that I look at things is that this massive amount of investment is expected to be spread out over decades. The potential long-term nature (duration) of the spend is one factor that gives me conviction that several of our holdings are in the early stages of a possible decade-long profit cycle. Now, AI is one very large and very important component of global infrastructure investment, but not the only component. Infrastructure includes everything from power and water to onshoring advanced manufacturing and supply chains to residential investment to national security and defense. Critical to everything (including AI) is power/electricity.

Can you talk a bit more about the power/electricity thesis?

What is very clear to me (and I have found nothing to refute this yet) is that the U.S. underinvested in its electrical grid for too long. The U.S. grid is old (40 years on average), stressed to the limits already with increasing blackouts, and is in dire need of upgrade/hardening, and buildout (extension) to make it more resilient to extreme weather events and to support decarbonization, the reindustrialization of America, and the electrification of everything (including the AI data center buildout). If an industrial renaissance and AI supremacy are end goals our country, then electricity (generation, transmission, and distribution) is the primary limiting factor (bottle neck) that must be dealt with, and to do so will likely require a decade or more of large, sustained investment into the grid as well as off-grid (behind-the-meter) solutions. Electricity load growth in the U.S. was roughly flat for the last decade, but several leading industry and research organization now expect electricity demand to grow by 1.5% to 3% in the next five years, and the Edison Electric Institute estimates that EEI member utilities will spend $1.1 trillion on the U.S. grid from 2025-2029.

You’re not going to get off that easy. Can you discuss your high-level thoughts on AI?

Global investment into AI is unprecedented (when measured on an absolute dollar level) and taking on a wartime posture/urgency because the innovation has the potential to fundamentally change the way the world works and lives and (unfortunately) wages war. AI could possibly lead to the creation of new products and industries, new discoveries, and the rapid advancement of science. I believe the U.S. views maintaining AI leadership as existential because we are in battle for AI supremacy with China. And it has also been suggested that billionaires in the tech world are in a race to create a digital God. I think it’s possible that AI (and the discoveries it has not yet made) ushers in a new industrial revolution that could last decades. After listening to the recent “Invest Like the Best” podcast with guest Dylan Patel, a thought was planted in my head. Dylan didn’t say this directly, but what he did say definitely led me here. And that thought is that when entrepreneurs were starting businesses in the past, they were trying to figure out how to get access to the best talent, square footage (office space, manufacturing space, store fronts, etc), and space in the cloud. But now start-up founders, in the tech world at least, are trying to figure out how to get access to a GW of power, GPUs, and how to become a key player/partner in the Nvidia and OpenAI ecosystems, while also providing mind-boggling pay packages for AI talent. The dynamics of starting and scaling a business have changed in a tectonic fashion and there has been a clear shift to prioritizing hardware and infrastructure spend and away from application software. Peter Oppenheimer at Goldman Sachs recently wrote that, “we have entered an era where the fortunes of the leading technology stocks are increasingly interdependent on the physical infrastructure around them. The surging demand for electricity cannot be solved through an app or piece of software.” We are currently in a situation where AI models are advancing with a dearth of compute so as long as scaling laws hold and models continue to advance towards AGI then I think it’s possible the investment into AI infrastructure (compute, AI factories, and power sources) will continue. And so, I think we’re at an inflection point and these inflection points and investment cycles can last a long time, not always but they can, and I think it’s at these inflection points and phase shifts that investors can make (or lose) lots of money. I’m not saying we will do either (make or lose)…I’m only speaking in general about the opportunities and risks of investing at major market and technological inflection points. 

But aren’t we in a massive AI bubble?

I think we are in an AI bubble, but I don’t know what inning we are in and don’t really want to try to guess.  I wake up some days and think we’re still early innings and others I think we’re firmly middle innings of this particular AI cycle bubble. Your guess is as good (maybe better) than mine. Goldman Sachs recently put out a note saying that while the AI capex investment is massive on an absolute dollar basis, it is much smaller than past infrastructure investment cycles as a percentage of GDP. Past cycles have ranged from 1.5% to 5% of GDP, while AI is still less than 1% of GDP. Honestly, who knows? But if I’m right that AI could possibly be the innovation that is largely responsible for ushering in a new industrial revolution (and possibly on a global scale) then I think it’s important to remember that industrial revolutions in the past have lasted decades, not just three years (Chat GPT was launched 3 years ago). So, if we are entering a fourth industrial revolution, then I think we’ll have several cycles of investment that expand and deflate (and maybe some burst violently) over the next several decades that could include AI, fully scaled EV charging infrastructure, autonomous driving, robotics (including humanoids), nuclear energy and SMRs, quantum computing, space infrastructure, and possibly (and importantly), as I said before, new products and industries that AI hasn’t discovered yet. The scale and speed of investment dollars into AI today is so mind-boggling that it hurts the brain to think about. But please also think about this potentiality: how big could the investment get in the future if AI not only unlocks trillions of dollars of corporate value in the form of productivity savings and new revenue generating opportunities, but also advances science and discovers something totally new like cures for diseases, new ways of building or urban planning, new ways to discard all our trash, ways to reverse environmental damage to our planet, or even alien life somewhere in the universe? Jeff Bezos recently said that he thinks AI is “going to affect every company in the world.” And then he reiterated, “I literally mean every company.” I’m not saying Bezos is right, but after hearing that, it was one of those days that I woke up thinking that we could still maybe be in the early innings. I think the thing to watch will be scaling laws, model advancement, and cost of compute. Goldman Sachs recently suggested that AI investment is “sustainable” as long as models continue to advance faster than the cost of compute falls. In other words, AI infrastructure build may beget more AI infrastructure build. 

Why are you investing in housing-related businesses?

Housing is a really important industry. Owning a home is a foundational pillar of the American dream, and for many people their home is their largest financial asset and an important component of net worth. Studying the housing industry is helpful (and I’d argue crucial) to understanding the U.S. economy and where we are in the economic cycle. New housing building permits is one of the ten leading economic indicators, and housing (shelter) makes up roughly 35% of the CPI and 15% of U.S. GDP. New residential construction has a multiplier effect on the U.S. economy, meaning that when money is invested in new housing units it cascades throughout the economy by not only creating construction jobs but by sending money into the building products/materials sector, home improvement retailers, mortgage lending and home insurance, a variety of home services (everything from plumbing and HVAC service to pool maintenance to pest control and landscaping) so the net effect is that $1 invested in new housing increases overall U.S. GDP by somewhere around $3.00 (source). I think that studying the housing industry has made me a better long-term investor. Housing as an investment today is intriguing to me because the U.S. underbuilt new homes coming out of the global financial crisis to the extent that McKinsey estimates that “Closing the gap by 2035 would mean building 9.6 million housing units on top of the roughly 850,000 units per year already expected from 2023 to 2035.” Meanwhile, Lowe’s CEO Marvin Ellison recently told Barron’s that we need to build 18 million new homes by 2033 just to meet current demand. Morgan Stanley has also recently reiterated the 18 million number, but by 2035. I’ve read other estimates that we are short anywhere from one million to 7 million homes. This shortage of homes (particularly entry-level starter homes) has created a supply/demand imbalance so home prices in the U.S. have increased by 50% since 2019. Rapid home price appreciation and record home prices combined with mortgage rates that are still 6.3% has led to very low home affordability. Resumption of student loan payments could put affordability for first-time home buyers ever further out of reach. The supply crunch is exacerbated by homeowners that want to move, but that feel locked into their 3%-4% mortgages. I think the bear argument for housing is that the supply shortage is not nearly as severe as the numbers suggest because baby boomers will flood the market with new inventory once interest rates drop. It’s a valid argument and one that I continue to consider, but at this point I believe that demand from millennials (the largest age cohort in U.S. history) will be enough to overwhelm an increase in existing home supply. The most striking statistic I’ve seen on housing recently was from Torsten Slok at Apollo that said first time home buyers accounted for 50% of activity in 2010 and that has dropped to 24% today. In addition to the supply/demand imbalance, my thesis for home builders and related businesses is that I think they meet my high-quality standards for the businesses and management teams, I think they are undervalued based on mid-cycle, normalized earnings, I think people will always invest in their homes (taking on bigger renovations and additions when times are good and still perform home maintenance and repair work when times are tougher), I think there is pent-up-demand for big renovations because home equity is at an all-time high, I think these holdings provide a counter-balance in the portfolio to some of our higher-multiple tech and AI-adjacent holdings, and I think it’s an opportune time to have the exposure in anticipation of more Federal Reserve interest rates cuts (which could hopefully lead to lower mortgage rates). 

What is the biggest risk of investing with you?

This is hard to say because the future is so unpredictable, and the biggest risk is not knowing what we don’t know. I may not know what my blind spots are and how that might impact the portfolio over time. But I’ll try my best to answer, and I think this depends on how you measure risk. If you measure risk as stock price volatility (really portfolio volatility) relative to the benchmark, then the Bastion Industrial and Infrastructure model portfolio is riskier than the market because we are, by definition, investing in some cyclical industries and the portfolio is not as diversified as the market. There was a point in time in late January into February 2025 when most of the stocks in the portfolio were down (in the red). So, pretty much red across the board. And although the Bastion Industrial and Infrastructure portfolio is not an AI portfolio (and we’re only invested in a few pure-play AI companies), many of our stocks get caught up in the “AI trade.” So, if (1) the rate of AI capex growth declines significantly or (2) scaling laws stop advancing and AI Capex outright declines and the AI bubble pops, I do think that our portfolio will underperform the market for a period of time (and maybe a long period of time). If you are looking for a smooth ride, this is not the portfolio for you! But I don’t think about risk that way, and in fact, I would welcome a broad market sell-off. I think about risk in two ways. Primarily, I think that risk is the possibility of permanent loss of capital. I think this risk is low because of the portfolio philosophy of uncompromising business/management quality and reasonable valuations, but of course I will be wrong in my assessment of quality and value at times. I also think of risk as not delivering annualized returns of inflation plus five percent. That is the minimum hurdle I set for myself. Because of insistence on quality and valuation discipline, I’d like to think (hope) that the portfolio can minimize blow ups (catastrophic stock drawdowns that fail to recover to previous highs), but I do expect that the portfolio will underperform the S&P 500 for periods of time, and possibly long periods of time. I’m also pretty sure that I will make each of the following mistakes (probably more than once) over a career of portfolio management: I’ll be wrong in my assessment of business and management quality. I will partner with the wrong management teams. I will pay too much. I will size/weight positions incorrectly. I will sell out too early. I will hold on too long. I will average down when I shouldn’t. I will fail to average up when I should. I will wait for a stock to fall only 5% more before buying only to watch it go up 500%. I will miss lots and lots of multi-baggers and especially those getting the most attention. 

Can you please summarize the biggest thematic risks in the portfolio?

I think the biggest thematic risks are if residential construction is not as underbuilt as I currently believe, or if we’re in a late-inning AI bubble (meaning scaling laws fail to hold, models don’t advance toward AGI or AI fails to deliver new revenue growth opportunities for users, AI capex declines, investors revalue the return on that capex, the excitement fizzles, the bubble pops, and doesn’t reflate).

That’s enough for now. My future letters will be much, much shorter than this first one.

It’s an honor to work on behalf of you and your families, and I thank you for your business and your trust.

Gratefully,

John Rotonti Jr

Portfolio Manager